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CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CANADA: The Social Construction of Racial Differences

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Biography

Peter S. Li is a professor of Sociology at the University of Saskatchewan and Chair of the Economic Domain at the Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration. He has served as associate editor of the Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology and is currently the associate editor of *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*. He has also served as consultant to several federal departments with regards to policies of immigration, multiculturalism and race relations.

Among his books are *Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada* (Oxford, 1999), *The Chinese in Canada* (Oxford, 1988, 1998), *The Making of Post-War Canada* (Oxford, 1996), *Racial Oppression in Canada* (Garamond, 1988), and *Ethnic Inequality in a Class Society* (Thompson, 1988).



1.0 Introduction

Recent public discourse has used the term “cultural diversity” to refer to the apparent growth of non-white population, other than the aboriginal people, in Canadian society. Underlying the popularity of the term “diversity” is a rising public awareness towards differences of people, which may be imagined or real, based on superficial distinctions such as skin colour and other features. The sensitivity towards racial differences has partly to do with a widely held belief that immigration since the late 1960s has altered the cultural mix of Canadians, and that the increase in diversity has caused, among other things, tensions and adjustments in Canadian society. Such a popular view is not entirely groundless, although many features are distorted or exaggerated. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the facts of diversity and to explain how racial differences in Canadian society have been produced and constructed, with the view of shedding light on policy options for the future.

2.0 Cultural Diversity in Canada

Canada's demographic composition is ethnically heterogeneous, in the sense that its citizens have come from many countries of origin and cultural backgrounds. One customary way to depict cultural diversity in Canada is describe it in terms of the population size of those not belonging to the two charter groups. Indeed, this was the method adopted by the *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* in the 1960s, which coined the term the “Third Force” to refer to Canadians not of British and French origin (Canada, *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, 1965: 52).¹ In its final report, the Royal Commission stressed that Canada was a mosaic, or a multicultural society, made up of three basic elements: the British, the French, and other Canadians. While recognizing the charter status of the British and the French, the Royal Commission also acknowledged the contributions of other non-charter groups. This trichotomy has been essentially adopted as the proper way to discuss the nature and composition of Canada's population diversity.

Historically, the numeric predominance of those of British and French origin was unquestionable. Before the great wave of European migration to Canada between 1896 and the beginning of the First World War, Canada's population was indeed mainly made up of those of British and French origin. For example, the 1871 Census of Canada shows that 60 percent of Canada's 3.5 million people were of British origin,

¹ The Royal Commission wrote a five-volume report, the first was published in 1967, and the last one in 1970 (Canada, *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, 1967, 1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1970). Throughout the report, the framework used was a trichotomy composed of the British, the French and other Canadians, which paid little attention to the First Nations as people with distinct aboriginal rights and entitlements.

and 30 percent French origin; Europeans not of British nor French origin accounted for only 7 percent of Canada's population in 1871 as well as in 1881 (Kalbach, 1990: 24). This demographic composition basically persisted until the turn of the century.

The wave of immigration to Canada prior to the First World War began to increase the stock of Europeans not from British or French origin. Between 1896 and 1914, over three million immigrants came to Canada. When the supply of emigrants from England and Western Europe was dwindling, Canada began accepting people from Eastern and Southern Europe, including Poles, Ukrainians, Hutterites and Doukhobors. In the period between the two world wars from 1915 to 1945, another two million immigrants came to Canada (Statistics Canada, 1983: A125-163).

The census data of Canada indicate that Canadians of European origin other than British and French increased from 8.5 percent of the total population in 1901 to 14.2 percent in 1921, and to 17.8 percent in 1941 (Kalbach, 1990: 24). In contrast, Canadians of British origin declined in relative terms from 57 percent of the total population in 1901 to 50 percent in 1941, but those of French origin remained at around 30 percent of the total population in 1901 and in 1941. In short, if the composition of Canadians of European origin other than British and French is used as an indicator of ethnic plurality, then there was an increase in diversity between 1901 and 1941. However, Canada's population in 1941, as in 1871, was made up of people mainly of European origin, which accounted for 98 percent of the total population in 1941 and in 1871, despite the fact that the population had increased from 3.5 million people in 1871 to 11.5 million people in 1941.

Table 1: Population by Ethnic Origin, Canada, 1921-1971

	<u>1921</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>
<u>Origin</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%
British	55.4	51.9	49.7	47.9	43.8	44.6
French	27.9	28.2	30.3	30.8	30.4	28.7
Other European	14.2	17.6	17.8	18.2	22.6	23
Asian	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.3
Aboriginal	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.5
Black	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Other	0.2	0.1	0.4	1.2	1.2	0.8
Total Per Cent	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total Number	8,787,949	10,376,786	11,506,655	14,009,429	18,238,247	21,568,310

Source:

Compiled from Census of Canada, 1971, Population: Ethnic Groups, Catalogue 92-723, Volume 1, Part 3, Bulletin 1.3, Table 1.



Between 1941 and 1961, the proportion of Canadians of European origin other than British and French further increased; in 1941, they made up 17.8 percent of the total Canadian population, by 1961, they rose to 22.6 percent (Table 1). In contrast, those of British origin declined in relative terms from 49.7 percent in 1941 to 43.8 percent in 1961. Thus, the expansion in ethnic diversity between 1941 to 1961 was also in the direction of increasing the proportion of Canadians of European origin other than British and French, and decreasing the proportion of Canadians of British origin. However, the ethnic composition of the Canadian population continued to be overwhelmingly those of European origin, which remained at 97 percent of the total population in 1961 and 96 percent in 1971. Thus, when the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism wrote about the “Third Force” and its place in the Canadian mosaic, it was writing from the vantage point of a multicultural Canada made up of mostly those of British, French and other European origin.

3.0 Changing Immigration Pattern and the Emergence of “Visible Minorities”

Historically, Canada had relied upon Western Europe, in particular Great Britain, as the major supplier of immigrants to Canada. In the two decades after the end of the Second World War, Canada maintained its policy of favouring immigrants from the United States, United Kingdom and other European countries. However, in the 1960s, there were major changes in the Canadian immigration policy which placed more emphasis on educational and occupational skills as criteria for selecting immigrants, although sponsored immigrants under family unification and refugee settlement remained important components of immigration.

Changes in immigration regulations in 1967 resulted in the adoption of a universal point system in assessing prospective immigrants, irrespective of country of origin or racial background (P.C. 1967-1616). The 1967 immigration regulations reflected Canada's attempt to compete for skilled labour around the world, although other factors were also influencing the change of policy (Li, 1992a).

The impact of the 1967 immigration regulations can be seen from immigration statistics (Li, 1992a: 153-157). Between 1954 and 1967, Canada lost 60,230 people in professional, technical, managerial, and entrepreneurial occupations to the United States. In return, Canada received 33,119 immigrants in these occupations from the United States. A consequence of the 1967 immigration regulations was to reverse this trend, as Canada placed more emphasis on human capital as the basis of immigrant selection. For the eighteen year period between 1968 and 1986, Canada experienced a net gain of 16,349 immigrants in professional, technical, managerial and entrepreneurial occupations from the United States (Li, 1992a).

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Although European immigrants to Canada made up the majority of immigration to Canada in the post-war period, their importance, in terms of the proportion of the total immigrants admitted, declined after 1967. In the 1940s and 1950s, immigration to Canada was made up almost exclusively of immigrants from Europe. For example, in the post-war years from 1946 to 1953, Canada admitted slightly less than 1 million immigrants into Canada, about 96 percent of whom came from Europe; British immigrants alone accounted for 35 percent of this stream of immigration (Statistics Canada, 1965). Between 1954 and 1988, Canada admitted 4.8 million immigrants, 56 percent of whom came from Europe, and 20 percent came from the United Kingdom alone.² However, this relatively high percentage of post-war European immigration was largely a result of the almost exclusive reliance on European immigration prior to 1967. Between 1968 and 1988, European immigrants to Canada declined to 1.1 million, or 38 percent of total immigrants to Canada. The percentage decline for British immigrants to Canada was from 28 percent for 1954-67 to 14 percent for 1968-88. No doubt, the changes in the immigration regulations in the 1960s enabled Canada to abandon national origin as an admission criterion, and to select immigrants from all over the world.

Since the 1970s, the increased presence of the visible minority in Canadian society has become more noticeable, although historically, Canada had relied upon waves of Oriental labour in the development of major industries and mega-projects in western Canada (Li, 1998a). The term “visible minorities” received official recognition in 1984 when Commissioner Rosalie S. Abella identified this group as constituting one of the four designated categories in the Royal Commission Report on Equality in

² Statistics on immigration are compiled from Immigration Statistics and Annual Reports of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (1956-65); Department of Manpower and Immigration (1966-76); Department of Employment and Immigration (1977-91); and Department of Citizenship and Immigration (1992).



Employment, in accordance with the terms of reference of the commission (Canada, *Royal Commission on Equality of Employment*, 1984). The subsequent Employment Equity Act of 1986 also specifically included "persons who are, because of their race or colour, in a visible minority in Canada" as one of the designated groups to whom employers on federal works or federal crown corporations had to take special measures to improve their employment opportunities (S.C., 1986, c. 31, s. 3).³ In the 1986 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada operationalized membership in a visible minority to include ten origins: Blacks, Indo-Pakistani, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, South East Asian, Filipino, Other Pacific Islanders, West Asian and Arab, and Latin American, excluding Argentinean and Chilean (Statistics Canada, 1990: 71-72).

In 1986, members of visible minorities made up 6.3 percent of Canada's population; by 1991, they climbed to 9.4 percent; and by 1996, 11.2 percent (Statistics Canada, 1998). Among the 3.2 million people who identified themselves as members of a visible minority in 1996, Chinese origin accounted for 27 percent, South Asian origin, 21 percent, and Black, 18 percent (Statistics Canada, 1998).

No doubt, the single most important factor contributing to the growth of the visible minority in Canada has been immigration since the 1970s. The removal of racial or national barrier in immigrant selection in 1967 has facilitated immigration from Asia, Africa and other non-traditional sources that historically were restricted to enter Canada.

Immigration statistics for the period after 1967 show that there has been an increase in the proportion of immigrants from Asia and Africa, and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of immigrants from Europe (Table 2). In the five years after 1967, between 1968 and 1971, Canada admitted 737,124 immigrants, of which slightly over half came from Europe, 15.5 percent from the United States, and 15 percent from Asian countries. Thereafter, the proportion of immigrants from Europe continued to decline: from 38 percent for 1973-77 to 22.6 percent for 1988-92. In contrast, Asian immigrants increased from 25.4 percent for the period between 1973 and 1977 to 40 percent between 1978 and 1982, and then further to 51.8 percent between 1988 and 1992. Similarly, African immigrants, which made up only 5 percent of immigrants between 1973 and 1977, rose to 6.7 percent between 1988 and 1992.

³ The 1986 *Employment Equity Act* defines the four designated groups as "women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and persons who are, because of their race or colour, in a visible minority in Canada" (S.C., 1986, c. 31, s. 3).

Table 2: Immigrant Arrivals by Countries of Last Permanent Residence, 1967-1991

<u>Period</u>		<u>Europe</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Central/ South America</u>	<u>Caribbean</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>Africa</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Oceania</u>	<u>Not Stated</u>	<u>Total</u>
1968-72	No.	387,670	114,615	24,863	53,100	112,584	22,014	18,656	0	3,622	737,124
	%	52.6	15.5	3.4	7.2	15.3	3	2.5	0	0.5	100
1973-77	No.	324,131	102,141	63,598	86,627	216,837	42,748	10,870	7,937	0	854,889
	%	37.9	11.9	7.4	10.1	25.4	5	1.3	0.9	0	100
1978-82	No.	196,546	49,407	36,262	39,362	236,596	21,946	6,438	4,502	232	591,291
	%	33.2	8.4	6.1	6.7	40	3.7	1.1	0.8	0	100
1983-87	No.	124,344	36,214	56,442	39,079	226,326	24,027	2,774	3,771	38	513,015
	%	24.2	7.1	11	7.6	44.1	4.7	0.5	0.7	0	100
1988-92	No.	237,666	33,686	91,061	59,911	545,410	70,744	4,771	8,534	0	1,051,783
	%	22.6	3.2	8.7	5.7	51.9	6.7	0.5	0.8	0	100
1993-95	No.	126,509	19,433	39,119	36,599	418,016	45,255	3,476	3,791	0	692,198
	%	18.3	2.8	5.7	5.3	60.4	6.5	0.5	0.5	0	100
1968-95	No.	1,396,866	355,496	311,345	314,678	1,755,769	226,734	46,985	28,535	3,892	4,440,300
	%	31.5	8	7	7.1	39.5	5.1	1.1	0.6	0.1	100

Source:

Compiled from Immigration Statistics, Employment and Immigration Canada, 1973-1991 Annual Edition; Immigration Statistics, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1995.

In total, for the 28-year period from 1968 to 1995, Canada admitted 4.4 million immigrants, of which 39.5 percent came from Asia, 5.1 percent from Africa, and 7.1 from the Caribbean. If immigrants from these regions were counted as members of visible minorities in Canadian society, then about 51.7 percent of the 4.4 million immigrants coming to Canada between 1968 and 1995 would have been members of visible minorities. In addition, if some of the immigrants from Central and South America were also counted as members of racial minorities, then the proportion of the visible minorities among immigrants to Canada between 1968 and 1995 would be 58.7 percent. For the same period, European immigrants made up 31.5 percent of all immigrants entering Canada, and immigrants from the United States accounted for 8 percent (Table 2).

The foregoing immigration statistics suggest that about 2.3 to 2.6 million members of visible minorities were added to the Canadian population between 1968 and 1995. In view of the fact that the total number of visible minorities was 1.6 million individuals in the 1986 Census, 2.6 million individuals in the 1991 Census, and 3.2 million individuals in the 1996 Census (Statistics Canada, 1998), then it is clear that immigration between the 1970s and 1990s alone would largely account for the emergence of the visible minority population. The immigration pattern also means that most members of the visible minority are first-generation immigrants born outside of Canada, in contrast to most European-Canadians who, because of a historical immigration policy in favour of their admission, tend to be native born in Canada.



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4.0 Changes in Ethnic and Racial Diversity

When the 1963 Royal Commission referred to the three elements of Canada's mosaic, it was, without any doubt, one that was overwhelmingly European in origin. Even within the so-called "Third Force" were mostly those of European origin. For example, the 1961 Census of Canada, taken just two years before the 1963 Royal Commission, clearly shows that about 88 percent of those not of British or French origin were of European origin (Table 3). This Canadian mosaic of Europeans has a history that dated back as early as the late nineteenth century, and it persisted for much of the twentieth century. Changes in the mosaic before the 1970s were mainly in the direction of having more European diversities in the Canadian population other than British and French.

By 1971, Canadians of European origin continued to account for 96 percent of the 21.5 million people in the total population. Those of European origin other than British and French remained the dominant element within the "Third Force", accounting for 85.5 percent of the 5.8 million people who declared a non-British and non-French ethnic origin in the 1971 Census (Table 3). However, by 1981, this group had declined to 75.8 percent of those not of British or French origin. By 1991, despite the growth of the non-British and non-French origin to 7.4 million people, the European component of the "Third Force" had further declined to 55.7 percent.

Hence, between 1971 and 1991, despite that fact that those not of British or French origin remained at around 26 to 28 percent of the total Canadian population,⁴ there were changes in the ethnic and racial differentiation in the "Third Force" to include a growing segment made up of non-European origin. For example, in 1971, those of Asian origin accounted for only 5 percent of those not of British or French origin; by 1981, they had grown to 11.3 percent, and by 1991, they had further increased to 21.6 percent. Similarly, those of African origin rose from less than 1 percent of those not of British or French origin in 1971 to 3.4 percent in 1991.

⁴ Calculations on ethnic origins of the Canadian population are complicated by changes in the questions used in various censuses. Since 1981, respondents to Canadian censuses were allowed to choose "multiple origins" as an answer to the ethnic origin question. As a result, 1,838,615 individuals, or 7.6 per cent of the total population, chose "multiple origins" as an answer to the "ethnic origin" question (Statistics Canada, 1984). In the 1991 Census, 7,794,250 individuals, or 28.9 per cent of the total population, chose "multiple origins"; 88.5 per cent of those who chose multiple origins made a selection that involved either British or French and other combinations (Statistics Canada, 1993).

Table 3: Composition of Non-British and Non-French Ethnic Origins in Canada, 1961-1991

	1961		1971		1981		1991	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-British and Non-French Single Ethnic Origin:								
European (non-British & non-French)	4,116,849	87.6	4,959,680	86	4,648,675	75.8	4,146,065	55.7
Aboriginal	220,121	4.7	312,760	5.4	413,380	6.7	470,615	6.3
Asian	121,753	2.6	285,540	5	694,830	11.3	1,607,230	21.6
African*	32127	0.7	34,445	0.6	55760	0.9	251,050	3.4
Latin, Central & South American**		117550	1.9	179930	2.4
Pacific Islanders		80,340	1.3	7,215	0.1
Other Single Origin	210,382	4.5	171,645	3	120,990	2	780,035	10.5
Total Number of People of Non-British And Non-French Single Origin	4,701,232	100	5,764,070	100	6,131,525	100	7,442,140	100
Non-British and Non-French Single Origins As % of Total Population		25.8		26.7		25.5		27.6
Total Population	18,238,247		21,568,310		24,083,495		26,994,045	

Notes:

*Includes "Negro" for 1961 and 1971, "North African Arab" for 1981, and "Black origins" for 1991;

**Includes "North American origins" (excluding "Native peoples") for 1981 and "Caribbean origins" for 1991;

Source:

Compiled from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census of Canada, Population: Ethnic Origins, Volume 1, Catalogue: 92-911, Ottawa: Minister of Trade and Commerce, 1962; Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada, Population: Ethnic Groups, Volume 1, Part 3, Bulletin 1.3, Table 1, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1973; Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada, Population: Ethnic Origin, Volume 1, Catalogue 92-911, Table 1, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984; Statistics Canada, 1991 Census of Canada, Ethnic Origin: The Nation, Catalogue 93-315, Table 1A, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1993.

By the time the 1991 Census was taken, 55 percent of the "Third Force" was still made up of Europeans, but about one-quarter of it was accounted for by Asians and Africans. Hence, it is not so much the increase in the proportion of the "Third Force" in the total population as the growth of racial minorities within the "Third Force" which made ethnic diversity more noticeable in Canada in the 1980s. This point is also evident in the 1996 Census, despite a substantial number of Canadians choosing the "multiple origins" and "Canadian origins". On the surface, it would appear that the non-British and non-French segment of Canada's population had grown to 49 percent in 1996 (Table 4). In reality, about 20.7 percent of the total population chose "Canadian origins". Thus, the segment of the population that was non-British, non-French and not Canadian origins made up 28.5 percent in 1996, which is comparable to the proportion of non-British and non-French reported in the 1961 to 1991 censuses (Table 3). Even within the more broadly defined category of non-British and non-French origins, "other European origins" and "Canadian origins" accounted for about two-thirds of this group.



The growth of visible minorities within the “Third Force” creates the impression that there has been more cultural diversity in the Canadian population, even though the Canadian population continues to consist of overwhelmingly those from British, French or other European origins. Undoubtedly, the increased immigration from Third World countries since the 1970s has contributed to the growth of Asians, Africans, and other visible minorities in Canada. The tendency of recent immigrants to settle in metropolitan areas also gives the impression that there have been dramatic changes in diversity. For example, even though nationally visible minorities made up 11.2 percent of Canada's population in 1996, they accounted for 32 percent of the population of the census metropolitan area in Toronto and 31 percent of that of Vancouver (Statistics Canada, 1998). Thus, the more conspicuous presence of visible minorities in Canadian society, especially in major urban centres, has given a new demographic and political reality to multiculturalism in Canada.

The tendency of recent immigrants to settle in metropolitan areas also gives the impression that there have been dramatic changes in diversity. For example, even though nationally visible minorities made up 11.2 percent of Canada's population in 1996, they accounted for 32 percent of the population of the census metropolitan area in Toronto and 31 percent of that of Vancouver (Statistics Canada, 1998).

Table 4: Composition of Ethnic Origins in Canada, 1996

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
British Single Origin	3,267,520	11.5
French Single Origin	2,683,840	9.4
British/French Multiple Origins	8,547,145	30.0
Non-British & Non-French Single and Multiple Origins	14,029,610 *	49.2 **
Total Population	28,528,115	100.0

	<u>Number</u> *	<u>%</u> **
Other European	3,742,890	13.1
Canadian origins (Single and Multiple)	5,906,045	20.7
Aboriginal	477,630	1.7
Asian	1,968,465	6.9
Arab origins	188,435	0.7
African	137,315	0.5
Latin, Central and South American	423,930	1.5
Pacific Islanders	5,765	0.0
Other (Single and Multiple origins)	1,179,135	4.1
Total Non-British and Non-French	14,029,610	49.2

Source:

Statistics Canada, 1996 Census of Canada, "Total Population by Ethnic Categories (36) and Sex (3), For Canada, Provinces, Territories and Census Metropolitan Areas, 1996" (Census 20% Sample Data) (93f0026XDB96002). Ottawa: Statistics, 1998.

5.0 The Politics of Multiculturalism

When the federal multiculturalism policy was first announced in 1971, it was described as an enlightened policy to allow individuals to pursue a cultural life of their free choice (Li, 1999). The policy was designed as complementary to the policy of bilingualism in that although linguistically, only English and French would remain official languages of Canada, culturally everyone would be equal. The multiculturalism policy was launched in part, to counteract Quebec nationalism, and in part, to appease the "Third Force" that was made up of mostly "other Europeans" in the 1960s. Thus, throughout the 1970s, the Multiculturalism Directorate promoted many programs aimed at helping ethnic groups to preserve their traditions, customs, folklore and languages to reinforce the multicultural image of Canadian society (Li, 1999).

By the 1980s, as the composition of the "Third Force" became more racially diverse, the idea of the multiculturalism policy as a vehicle for cultural preservation became less appealing to many members of the visible minority who were more concerned with job and other opportunities as they faced racism and discrimination in Canadian society.

During the hearings of the House of Commons Special Committee on Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian Society in 1983, many witnesses representing national



organizations of racial minorities spoke about the prevalence of racial discrimination in Canadian society and the need of the government to make institutional and legislative changes in order to combat racism (Canada, House of Commons, 1983). In its report to the House of Commons, the Committee noted the urgency to make policy changes to include visible minorities in key public institutions (Canada, House of Commons, 1984: 50). The Committee characterized Canadian society as "multicultural and multiracial", and recommended further initiatives of the Multiculturalism Directorate in the direction of promoting race relations, notwithstanding reservations from some ethnic groups that were more concerned with cultural preservation (Canada, House of Commons, 1984: 55).

The growth of the visible minority population had intensified the critique of the federal multiculturalism policy as being too much oriented towards cultural preservation, and not enough towards promoting social equality. The 1987 House of Commons Standing Committee on Multiculturalism stated that it was not always accurate to assume that the cultural orientation of the multiculturalism policy was enunciated by "established" ethnocultural communities, mostly of European origin (Canada, House of Commons, 1987: 22-24). But the Committee's description of the differences between the cultural orientation and equality orientation suggests that European ethnocultural groups had different expectations from the multiculturalism policy than the visible minority. As the visible minority population increased, and along with it, a greater concern was voiced over the question of racism and discrimination, the apparent contention between the cultural orientation and equality orientation towards the multiculturalism policy was sharpened.

Increased racial diversity in Canadian society in the 1980s had created a new demographic and political reality that demanded changes in the multiculturalism policy. Judging from the changes in the multiculturalism program and the statements made by the Minister of State for Multiculturalism in the 1980s, it is clear that a greater emphasis was placed on the multiculturalism policy as a vehicle to promote more racial equality and racial harmony in Canadian society.

It would be incorrect to assume that the demographic basis of racial diversity alone was sufficient to promote an emphasis of the multiculturalism policy towards greater social equality. It must be remembered that the federal government in the early 1980s was very much concerned with the patriation of the constitution from the United Kingdom, and in the process, was trying to seek an agreement from provinces and lobbying groups to enshrine a charter of rights and freedoms in the constitution. The success of constitutional patriation needed, among other things, a public awareness and support of social values pertaining to equality, justice and freedom. Thus, the policy emphasis of the federal government of the 1980s on greater social equality was consistent with the political priority of constitutional patriation. Undoubtedly, public discussions of the Charter and its eventual entrenchment in the Constitution also instilled a greater awareness among the Canadian public towards social equality. However, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 and the subsequent rejection of

the Charlottetown Accord shook the public confidence in the government, and along with it, weakened the public support of the multiculturalism policy.⁵ Political concerns of the constitutional patriation, together with the emergence of the visible minority as a demographic reality, would account for the greater emphasis of the multiculturalism policy towards promoting equality and eradicating racism in the 1980s, and subsequent political developments of constitutional amendments and waning public support of the government would provide a rationale as to why there was an apparent retrenchment of the multiculturalism policy in the 1990s.

6.0 Racial Inequality and the Politics of Difference

Demographic changes and the politics of multiculturalism were not the only factors which contributed to the making of racial differences in Canadian society. In reality, racial distinctions are also reproduced by unequal life chances and by normative values regarding people of colour.

Substantial evidence is now available to indicate that the Canadian labour market provides lower economic returns to visible minorities (Li, 1988, 1992b, 1997). Women of colour, in particular, suffer severe market disadvantage. For example, data from the 1986 Census indicate that visible minority women earned about 49 percent of what white men made in the labour market, while visible minority men earned about 80 percent (Li, 1992b: 497). Data from the 1991 Census further show that visible minorities earned substantially less than white Canadians even after differences in human capital and other factors have been taken into account (Li, 1997, 1998b; Pendakur & Pendakur, 1996).

The most recent census data for 1996 continue to reflect the earning disadvantage of those of visible minority origin (Table 5). For example, those of West Asian origin and those of Latin America origin earned \$6,933 and \$8,452 below the national mean respectively (Table 5). Blacks earned \$5,310 below the national average earning and those of Vietnamese origin earned \$4,968 below that level. No doubt, some of the differences in earnings can be attributed to variations in human capital, labour market experiences, and demographic characteristics. However, when these other differences are taken into account, Table 5 (last column) still shows lower net earnings associated with visible minority origins. The Chinese and the West Asians, for example, earned \$3,188 and \$5,937 less than the average respectively. In fact, all visible minorities had substantial net earning levels below the mean. In contrast, most of the non-visible minority groups had earnings either above the mean or slightly below the mean; the noted exceptions were those of Greek origin (-\$2,298) and those of Hungarian origin (-\$1,115). These data suggest that there is a differential market value attached to people of different racial origin in the Canadian labour market.

⁵ For a discussion of popular and partisan opposition to multiculturalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Abu-Laban & Stasiulis (1992).



Although all visible minorities earned less than the national average after inter-group differences were taken into account, some earned more than before while others earned less. For example, the Chinese earned even less, and those of Filipino, Latin American, or Black origin earned substantially more after other variations are controlled. One reason has to do with the differences in educational levels of various groups. For some groups such as the Chinese, they earned more before controlling for other variations because they had relatively high educational level. But when their educational level is assumed to be the same as the national average, they suffer a larger income disadvantage. Conversely, a group such as the Blacks earned less than the national average in part because of their relatively low education level. When their educational level is assumed to be the same as others, their income improves, but not to the extent that it matches the national average. The data are unequivocal in showing that non-white origin creates a penalty for all visible minorities in the labour market. In contrast, white Canadians tended to have an income level above the national average, except for those from some South European and some East European origins. Even in those European-origin groups whose income fell below the average, the deviations were much less than that of non-white Canadians. Since income differentials are maintained after adjusting for other differences, it can be said that non-white Canadians, both aboriginal people and visible minorities, are penalized in terms of receiving a lower income that is attributed to their origin. By comparison, most white Canadians enjoy an income premium due to their origin.

Many other studies have also shown that life chances for various racial and ethnic groups are not the same, and that visible minorities such as Asians and blacks have lower earning returns in the Canadian labour market than white Canadians (Retiz & Breton, 1994; Satzewich & Li, 1987; Abella, 1984). Several factors have been identified as creating barriers of employment and social mobility for non-white Canadians, especially those who are immigrants. These factors include the difficulty faced by many non-white immigrants in having their credentials fully recognized in Canada (McDade, 1988; Zong & Basran, 1998), and employment discrimination against racial minorities with identifiable linguistic characteristics and racial features (Henry & Ginsberg, 1985; Henry, 1989; Scassa, 1994). These studies offer some explanations as to how those of non-white origins are associated with a lower market value; in essence, it has much to do with racial minorities being disadvantaged in the labour market as a result of racial discrimination, or differential treatment based on superficial differences.

Table 5: Gross and Net Labour Market Earnings of Racial and Ethnic Groups, Canada, 1996

Racial and Ethnic Groups	Number	Labour Market Earnings As Deviations Above (+) or Below (-) National Mean	
		Gross	Net
Not Visible Minorities			
British, British Isles, British and Canadian	94,288	2,929	914
French, French and Canadian	48,542	497	78
Dutch	5,148	1,694	912
German	11,708	681	-533
Other West European	1,352	2,525	-61
Hungarian	1,442	1,767	-1,115
Polish	3,811	464	-850
Ukrainian	5,034	2,278	-246
Balkan	2,433	-159	-669
Greek	2,373	-4,258	-2,298
Italian	11,361	1,943	1,031
Portuguese	3,735	-2,464	1,359
Spanish	392	793	-720
Jewish	2,827	12,700	6,632
Other European	5,945	2,696	-87
Other British multiple origins	38,763	-121	731
Other French multiple origins	7,123	-93	394
British and French, British and French and other	23,370	-1,041	234
Other single and multiple origins	23,969	960	689
Canadian	72,234	-2,037	-177
Visible Minorities			
Arab	1,438	-4,162	-4,042
West Asian	798	-6,933	-5,937
South Asian	8,685	-3,129	-2,203
Chinese	11,150	-2,684	-3,188
Filipino	3,290	-5,070	-3,630
Vietnamese	1,249	-4,968	-4,240
Other East/South East Asian	1,940	-1,755	-1,528
Latin/Central/South American	1,137	-8,452	-3,862
Black	6,987	-5,310	-2,867
Other single and multiple origins	4,296	-5,063	-2,712
Aboriginal People	8,273	-8,899	-3,474
Total	415,093		
Average Labour Market Earnings (all groups)		25,663	25,663

Note:

Gross earnings in deviations are actual differences from the mean when variations in other variables have not been taken into account. Net earnings in deviations are residual differences after variations in years of schooling, full-time/part-time employment, industry of work, occupation, number of weeks worked, age, gender, nativity and official language ability have been statistically controlled.

Source

Calculated from Statistics Canada, 1996 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on Individuals, 1999.



In addition to unequal life chances, racial differences are also reproduced as normative values in Canadian society. Canada has a long history of maintaining discriminatory policies and practices towards Canadians deemed to be racially different based on skin colour and other superficial features. Over time, differential treatments and unfavourable policies targeted towards racial minorities become in themselves identifiable characteristics of these groups. In this way, superficial characteristics of racial minorities are inseparable from unfavourable social features attributed to them.

There is substantial evidence to indicate that to this day, Canadian society continues to attribute unequal social value to people of different origins. Many studies have shown that Canadians regard non-white minorities as socially less desirable and less favourable than people of European origin (Angus Reid Group, 1991; Kalin and Berry, 1996), and that the notion of “race” remains meaningful to many people as a means to make sense of their everyday experiences (Li, 1994).

The politics of difference were well articulated in the public discourse in the early 1990s, when the debate over the constitutional and sovereignty claims of Quebec divided Canada and prompted a retrenchment of the multiculturalism policy, one that was seen by some as divisive. Several opinion polls indicate that there has been a persistent degree of unwillingness on the part of some Canadians to accept those of “non-White” origins as worthy Canadians. For example, a 1991 national attitudinal survey commissioned by Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada found that respondents displayed different degrees of “comfort” towards individuals of various ethnic backgrounds; ethnic groups of European origin enjoyed higher social rankings than those of non-White origin, mostly Asians and Blacks (Angus Reid Group, 1991; Kalin & Berry, 1996). The same survey also indicated that Canadians showed contradictory tendencies with respect to the principle of equality and support of minority rights. For example, 85 percent of the respondents said that they support a multiculturalism policy which promotes equality among all Canadians, regardless of racial or ethnic origin (Angus Reid Group, 1991: 24). At the same time, 28 percent of the people being surveyed said “people who come to Canada should change to be more like us” (Angus Reid Group, 1991: 35). Another public opinion poll conducted in 1993 also indicated the unpopularity of the multiculturalism policy at the time: as many as 72 percent of the respondents believed “that the long standing image Canada as a nation of communities, each ethnic and racial group preserving its own identity with the help of government policy, must give way to the U.S. style of cultural absorption” (Globe and Mail 1993: A1, A2). Another survey, conducted by Ekos Research Associates in 1994, found that most respondents agreed that there are too many immigrants, especially from visible minority groups, and that 60 percent of respondents agreed that “too many immigrants feel no obligation to adapt to Canadians values and way of life” (Globe and Mail, 1994). These results indicate that a segment of the Canadian public persistently sees visible minorities as being the major problem of immigration, and that their alleged unwillingness to adapt to Canadian values and lifestyle is undermining Canada's “social cohesion”.

Despite the absence of evidence that non-white immigrants are weakening the unity and cohesion of Canada, it is often suggested that too much racial and cultural diversity will lead to fragmentation of Canadian society. An example of such a position widely circulated in immigration consultation circle is as follows: “Many people ... are also worried that their country is becoming fragmented, that it is becoming a loose collection of parts each pursuing its own agenda, rather than a cohesive entity striving for collective good of Canada. Many Canadians are concerned that immigration and citizenship policies attend too much to the concerns of special interest groups, rather than to those of average Canadians.” (Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, 1994a: 10). Often time, concerns over racial differences are couched as the problem of high cost and limited capacity to integrate immigrants of diverse cultural backgrounds.⁶ The corollary of this argument is that unless the cost and capacity of absorbing “differences” in Canadian society are increased, it would create social stress and tension in trying to incorporate people of diverse cultural origins, and that it is justifiable and necessary to control the rate of immigration that contributes to racial and cultural diversity, which in turn, creates social disruption. Over time, a vicious circle emerges in the public discourse of racial differences: racial diversity and the multiculturalism policy are seen as divisive, and public opinions about racial diversity become evidence of how cultural differences result in clashes in values and lifestyles; in turn, public policies have to take cognizance of the need to manage diversity to prevent further fragmentation and disharmony. In this way, managing diversity becomes synonymous with promoting social cohesion.

The salience of these political debates suggests that despite the multiculturalism policy and the legal entrenchment of human rights in the post-war decades, Canadian society continues to consider it meaningful to use “race” as a basis to evaluate the social standing, competence and desirability of others. As well, they show that non-white racial minorities in Canada are often regarded as less desirable as compared to people of European origin.

It should be recognized that the social value and market value attached to racial origin are related (Li, 1998b). It can be seen that economic disadvantages associated with certain racial origins reinforce their low social standing since people so marked carry a lower market worth. In the long run, economic disparities according to racial origins help to maintain the social reality of race by giving a discounted market value to certain racial groups. In turn, the low social value given to certain racial origins creates obstacles which further limit the market outcomes for people being racialized.

⁶ For example, in a government initiated conference to develop a strategy for citizenship and immigration, one of the questions posed to the participants was as follows: “Does the current cultural mix prevent adequate integration of newcomers?” (Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, 1994b: 46).



7.0 Concluding Remarks

The statistics on ethnic diversity of Canada show that since the turn of the century until the 1960s, there had been an increase in the proportion of those not of British and French origin. But such an increase was largely accounted for by more European diversities in the Canadian population other than British and French. Throughout much of the twentieth century and until 1971, over 96 percent of the Canadian population were made up of people of European origin.

Since 1971, there have been only nominal changes in the ethnic diversity in Canada in terms of increases in the proportion of Canadians not of British or French origin. Canada remains a country that is made up overwhelmingly of people of European origin, despite changes in the national origin of immigrants coming to Canada since the 1970s. However, within the “Third Force”, that is the group made up of non-British and non-French, there have been changes in the direction of a larger proportion being made up of members of the visible minority. These changes were largely brought about as a result of more immigrants from Asian, Africa, and other non-European regions being admitted into Canada after national origin was removed from the selection criteria of immigrants in the 1960s. By 1991, visible minorities accounted for 9.4 percent of the total population in Canada, and by, 1996, 11.2 percent (Statistics Canada, 1998).

The growth of the visible minority in Canada in the 1980s had created a new demographic and political reality, and along with it, growing concerns about the plight of racial minorities in Canadian society, as they experienced unequal life chances in Canada. The government changed the emphasis of the multiculturalism policy in the 1980s to pay more attention to issues of racial equality and racial harmony. It would appear that while the emergence of the visible minority in Canada created the political constituency to lobby for more racial equality, the political agenda of constitutional patriation had also produced a political climate for the state to support a public awareness towards racial equality and social justice.

Racial differences in Canadian society are also reproduced by unequal life chances, as well as normative values which attribute a lower social worth to those of non-white origin. Substantial evidence is available to indicate that the visible minority origins carry an earning penalty in the Canadian labour market that can be attributed to their non-white origin.

Another dimension in the politics of difference involves the debate over the social cost of racial diversity. Racial diversities are often assumed in public discourse as divisive and costly in Canadian society, which in turn, justify public policies to control the rate of that component of immigration which contributes to the disorderly expansion of “cultural diversity” beyond Canada's means and capacity to absorb differences. In short, “cultural diversity” and “cultural differences” become codified concepts to signify the fundamental distinctions of “races” and the injurious consequences such distinction would bring to what otherwise would be a socially and culturally cohesive

Canada. Despite the absence of scientific evidence showing how Canada's "cohesiveness" has become more fragmented as a result of the growth of the visible minority population, unfavourable opinions expressed in public polls towards various aspects of the visible minority, immigration and integration are often used as self evident grounds to indicate "social fragmentation" and "racial tension".

Thus, the challenge of cultural or racial diversity has less to do with the threat of visible minorities to Canada's "social cohesion" than Canada's unwillingness to see itself beyond a conventionally European society, and to position itself as a global nation of many cultures and people. In short, racial diversity is created less by demographic changes than by the reproduction of a normative and an economic order which reinforces social differentiation based on race and racial origin.

Thus, the challenge of cultural or racial diversity has less to do with the threat of visible minorities to Canada's "social cohesion" than Canada's unwillingness to see itself beyond a conventionally European society, and to position itself as a global nation of many cultures and people.

There is no doubt that the growth of visible minorities in Canada has created a new demographic and political challenge for the future of Canada, despite the fact that numerically they only account for 11.2 percent of Canada's 1996 population. Projections into the 21st century indicate that the visible minority population in Canada will continue to grow faster than the total population, albeit at a declining rate (Dai & George, 1996: 27). Using various scenarios of population growth, the visible minority is estimated to be around 19.4 to 20.6 percent of Canada's population by 2016. The prospect that one-fifth of Canadians would be non-white should be alarming to those who already feel that the European tradition and social fabric of Canada have been undermined by the current non-white population, and who defend a social and nominal order which accentuates "racial" differences.



It would appear that Canada has the policy option of following the alarmists' narrow vision of cultural dominance based on race and superficial features of people, and continuing to frame policies that implicitly recognize the social significance of race. Alternatively, Canada may abandon its cultural parochialism and treat racial and linguistic diversity in Canadian society as potential resources with which multilateral trade, international diplomacy and other global exchanges can be further advanced. In short, in recognizing the value of cultural differences and racial diversity, Canada is also better positioning itself in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized in economy and culture. Canada has already committed itself to such a future when it entrenched the principles of equality and non-discrimination in the Charter. The question facing Canada's future is how to bridge the gap between what it commits *de jure* and what it does *de facto*.

[I]n recognizing the value of cultural differences and racial diversity, Canada is also better positioning itself in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized in economy and culture. Canada has already committed itself to such a future when it entrenched the principles of equality and non-discrimination in the Charter.

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